Twenty-five branded villas in Meydan District 11, land owned outright, build part-way through, and a bank market that would not fund it. How we structured and placed the requirement with private credit, and what made it fundable.
Anonymised at the sponsor's request. The project name, sponsor and lender are withheld. Figures are rounded. This is a real transaction we structured and placed; the terms described are indicative of the facility secured and are not a template or an offer.
| Element | Detail |
|---|---|
| Asset | 25 branded luxury villas, 254,000 sq ft built-up area |
| Location | District 11, Meydan, Dubai |
| Stage | Part-complete; approximately 26 months of construction remaining |
| Land | Owned outright and unencumbered, valued at around $105m |
| Facility | $30m senior secured construction-to-sale bridge, 27 months |
| Cost to complete | Around $77.7m, giving a loan-to-cost of 38.6% |
| GDV | Around $221m |
| Pre-sales | 5 units contracted before completion, roughly $80m of non-cancellable value |
| Security | First legal charge over the plot, assignment over units, charge over escrow receivables |
The sponsor had done the difficult part. The land was bought and paid for outright, planning was in place, the brand was secured, and construction was under way on a 25-villa scheme a short drive from the centre of Dubai. What they did not want to do was fund the remaining build entirely from their own balance sheet, because that capital had better uses and the timeline was stretching.
The requirement was not a purchase facility or a refinance. It was completion capital: money to carry the scheme through roughly 26 months of construction to handover, repaid from sales rather than from a refinance at the end. In the UK, that is a familiar conversation. In Dubai, it is not, because the market does not have a bridging industry in the way London does.
The sponsor had already tested the conventional route and the answer was predictable.
None of that made the deal bad. It made it wrong for a bank's credit policy, which is a different thing entirely.
The work was less about finding a lender and more about presenting the asset so that the right lender could see what it actually was. Five things did the heavy lifting.
Most construction requests arrive as a request for risk capital. This one had roughly $105m of unencumbered land sitting in the capital stack, which meant the lender was not really taking construction risk at all. Against a $30m facility, the land alone represented a loan-to-value of under 29%. Once that was framed as the first-loss buffer it is, the conversation changed from "should we fund a build" to "how do we document against prime Dubai land".
The number that kills construction facilities is an unrealistic cost to complete. We worked from the remaining budget of roughly $77.7m, with contingency, and showed the facility as 38.6% of it. A lender can underwrite 39% loan-to-cost. It cannot underwrite a sponsor who has not counted properly.
Five units were contracted before completion, representing around $80m of non-cancellable sales value. That is 2.7 times the facility before a single further villa is sold. Presented properly, that is not a marketing statistic, it is the repayment source, and it moves the deal from speculative to bankable.
Dubai's regulated escrow framework is often described as a compliance burden. In this transaction it was the opposite. Buyer instalments flow into a monitored project account on a 70/30 structure, roughly $5.3m a month during construction against contractor draws of about $3m. That surplus is what allows a 50% cash sweep: half of each month's receipts pays down interest and principal automatically, and the facility extinguishes itself by the end of the term rather than relying on a refinance at handover.
First legal charge over the plot, assignment over the units, and a charge over the escrow receivables. In a market where lenders otherwise rely on a share pledge over the borrowing company, this package gave the lender direct control of the cash rather than indirect control of a company. That is a materially better position, and it is what allowed the pricing to sit where it did.
Indicative terms of the solution placed, summarised for the purposes of this case study:
The structural point worth understanding is the sweep. A facility repaid at maturity depends on the market being kind at exactly the wrong moment. A facility that sweeps half of every month's receipts from a government-monitored escrow account repays itself on a schedule that has nothing to do with sentiment. That is the difference between construction finance that completes and construction finance that ends in a conversation about extension fees.
| Challenge | Our answer |
|---|---|
| Is the land really worth that? | We supported value with acquisition evidence and a lender-accepted valuation rather than the sponsor's own figure. |
| What if the build overruns? | Contingency within the cost to complete, a fixed-price contract with a credible contractor, and monthly monitoring surveyor certification before each draw. |
| Are the pre-sales real? | Contracted, non-cancellable reservations registered within the regulated escrow framework, not letters of intent. |
| Who controls the cash? | The escrow charge and the sweep mechanism, with drawdowns released only against certified works. |
| What if sales slow? | Modelled downside absorption, not the base case, and showed cover from the existing contracted backlog alone. |
The same structure appears repeatedly in cross-border work: a part-complete scheme, an owned asset, contracted demand and a sponsor who needs completion capital rather than a sale. If you are funding a development in the UAE, we can look at facilities from AED 70 million through private credit, and if the right answer is a UK-secured facility against British property, that is usually cheaper and we will say so.
Both, in effect. It is a construction-to-sale facility: it funds remaining build costs and repays from sales during the term rather than requiring a refinance at the end. UK readers can think of it as development finance with a bridging exit built in.
The leverage, the speed and the structure. Regional banks generally cap out at 40% to 50% loan to value and take months to reach credit committee. Private credit prices higher and moves faster, which was the right trade for this programme.
Yes, subject to entity structuring, source of funds and AML requirements. Cross-border ownership adds due diligence rather than blocking the transaction.
The UAE private credit facility we access starts at AED 70 million. Smaller requirements are better served by a UK-secured facility or by an in-country lender with a lower floor, and we will tell you which applies.
Send us the appraisal, the cost to complete and the sales position. We will tell you honestly whether it is fundable, and what would need to change if it is not.
Start a ConversationAnonymised case study. Details have been rounded and identifying information removed at the sponsor's request. Terms are indicative of the facility placed and do not constitute an offer of credit. Facilities secured on property outside the UK generally fall outside UK mortgage regulation.
Recent case study: a three-day rebridge at 48% LTV in central London — refinance blocked by Land Registry delays, funds released by Monday.
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